Regulating a firm under adverse selection and moral hazard in uncertain environment

HIGHLIGHTS

• who: Jing Feng and colleagues from the Institute of Systems Engineering, Tianjin University, Tianjin, China have published the research: Regulating a Firm under Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Uncertain Environment, in the Journal: (JOURNAL) of 27/Nov/2013
• what: The authors show that the regulator will set the firms` effort level as zero under observable effort whether the market capacity is full or private information; that is, the effort has no impact on the optimal regulatory policy regardless of the market capacity being full or private information. Motivated by this, this paper studies a . . .
  

   

  

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