Adaptive dynamics of extortion and compliance

HIGHLIGHTS

• who: Christian Hilbe and collaborators from the Evolutionary Theory Group, Max-Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Plön, Germany, Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge have published the research: Adaptive Dynamics of Extortion and Compliance, in the Journal: PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org of September/11,/2013
• what: Whether cooperative strategies are favored in the long run critically depends on the size of the population; the authors show that cooperation is most abundant in large populations in which case average payoffs approach the social optimum. In the appendix the authors show that this subset . . .
  

   

  

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