HIGHLIGHTS
SUMMARY
Today, researchers often take some kind of middle position, according to which moral judgments can be both immediately triggered by intuition without deliberate reflection, and also be the result of more or less careful deliberations (Cushman et_al, 2010; Waldmann et_al, 2012; Weaver et_al, 2014). In this context, researchers often assume that individuals possess metacognitive control over whether to make a judgment analytically or intuitively, and that research on intuition and analysis effectiveness may guide individuals in this respect (Betsch and amp; Glöckner, 2010; Luoma and amp; Martela, 2021; Salas et_al, 2010; Shapiro and . . .
If you want to have access to all the content you need to log in!
Thanks :)
If you don't have an account, you can create one here.