When we formulate it semantically. all it takes for anti-skepticism to be true is for our epistemic terms to have picked up anti-skeptical extensions. […] sure, maybe it could be that we’ve ended up using words with skeptical extensions, but, equally surely it would seem, it could be that we are, and have been all along, using our words with anti-skeptical extensions. why not? can’t some words have anti-skeptical extensions, and why can’t our words have them? (dogramaci, 2019 , pp. 880-1) i agree with this point – there does seem to be something ini- tially more plausible about an anti-skeptical outcome when our motivating question is framed linguistically – about our knowledge terms rather than about knowledge. let’s call this the initial thought . the aim of this paper is to identify why this would be the case and whether it can form the basis
HIGHLIGHTS SUMMARY All it takes for anti-skepticism to be true is for the epistemic terms to have picked up anti-skeptical […]