HIGHLIGHTS
SUMMARY
The ways in which such inferences occur remain a longstanding question (Adolphs, 2010; Singer and amp; Lamm, 2009; Gallagher and amp; Frith, 2003), but theories of embodied cognition have highlighted the importance of bodily states in providing a window onto the mental states of others (Keysers et_al, 2018; Grafton, 2009; Bastiaansen et_al, 2009; Goldman and amp; de Vignemont, 2009). This idea relates to the "mirroring mechanism" in action/emotion observation (Ferrari and amp; Rizzolatti, 2014; Gallese and amp; Sinigaglia, 2011; Lamm et_al, 2011; Van Overwalle and amp; Baetens, 2009; Wicker et_al, 2003), whereby observing . . .
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