Two types of refutation in philosophical argumentation

HIGHLIGHTS

• who: Catarina Dutilh Novaes from the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands University of StAndrews, StAndrews, United Kingdom have published the Article: Two Types of Refutation in Philosophical Argumentation, in the Journal: (JOURNAL)
• what: If this is the case, then one might expect that, while bearing similarities with argumentation elsewhere, philosophical inquiry will also rely on specific argumentative practices suitable for the overall goal of questioning the obvious (which is quite different from, for example, achieving consensus in a coordination problem). But they are one element within broader strategies of refutation, whereas in the twentieth . . .
  

   

  

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